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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the best trade approach for Southern 
Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon and Turkey) that helps them increase market access and develop trade policies 
which will facilitate the most efficient economic development. The study uses, the 
MacMap-HS6 database on market access and the Modeling International Relations under 
Applied General Equilibrium (MIRAGE) model of the global economy. While most 
South Mediterranean (SM) countries are very protectionist, they enjoy a fairly good 
access to world markets, either due to product specialization or to preferences granted by 
the European Union in the industrial sector. Today, these countries are simultaneously 
opting for multilateralism, North-South regionalism, and South-south regionalism. Are 
these options substitutes of each other? As this study suggests, that is not the case. A 
South-South integration of these countries is not enough trade – creating, while a North – 
South Free Trade Agreement with Europe is significantly trade – diverting, particularly in 
the case of SM countries’ agricultural imports. In order to examine the dynamics between 
multilateralism and regional strategies, the ‘structural congruence’ of these different 
trade regimes is measured and a new indicator is proposed.     1
DEFINING A TRADE STRATEGY 





The recent evolution of the international trading system has moved in two 
directions: multilateral trade agreements and regional free trade agreements. Although the 
progress of the ongoing WTO trade negotiations is surprisingly slow, multilateralism 
continues to play a crucial role in the international trading system.  On the other hand, 
regional free trade agreements have been the dominant alternative. By 2001, only seven 
countries were not members of a regional trade agreement, either reciprocal or non 
reciprocal
2.  
Apparently, Southern Mediterranean (SM) countries
3 have not oriented their trade 
policies in a clear-cut direction. From a multilateral point of view, some are WTO 
members: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey since 1995, and Jordan since 2000. 
Algeria, Libya and Lebanon have been granted an observer status; it means that they will 
become WTO members soon.  
From a regional point of view, all of these 9 countries, except Libya, have been 
conceded trade preferences from their very rich Mediterranean neighbor, the European 
                                                 
1 Antoine Bouet is Senior Research Fellow at Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, IFPRI, Washington, 
DC. Email: a.bouet@cgiar.org.  
2 See Bouet and Mayer, (2003).  
3 We define this group as: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey.   2
Union (EU)
4. But this regional strategy is unique. SM countries have been receiving trade 
preferences from EU for a few decades, but these preferences only concern a non-
reciprocal free access for industrial products; they do not include any preference on 
exportation of agricultural goods and services to Europe. In 1995, the Barcelona 
declaration defined a new partnership between European Union and SM countries. The 
preferential access of SM countries to the European market is becoming perennial, the 
cumulating of rules of origin is being extended and SM countries will open their 
industrial sectors to European products, while Europe is already open
5.  
The European Union has lost its position of being the only regional trading 
partner of SM countries. Morocco and Jordan have signed a free trade agreement with the 
USA. Furthermore, bilateral reciprocal agreements with rich countries are not the only 
means by which SM countries are establishing regional partnerships: South-South 
integration is also taking place as Morocco concluded free trade agreements with Algeria 
(Tariff convention, March 14
th, 1989) and Libya (Tariff convention, June 29
th, 1990). 
Finally, a great pan-Arabian free trade area is in progress since the decision adopted by 
the Arabian League in 1997. Tariff dismantling started on January 1
st, 1998, but it 
includes numerous exceptions.  
Designing a free trade strategy is all the more important given that these countries 
are highly protectionist: from the 163 countries available in the MacMap-HS6 database 
for 2001, Egypt is ranked 5
th among the most protectionist countries, Libya 9
th, Morocco 
                                                 
4 The Euromed partnership concerns these 8 countries, plus Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Libya has 
an observer status since 1999. 
5 Turkey signed an industrial custom union agreement with Europe in 1995.   3
10
th, and Tunisia 11
th. Only Turkey and particularly Lebanon are open countries
6 in this 
group.  
After having adopted import substitution strategies, SM countries have now 
reversed their trade policies, opting for trade openness. In that perspective, they 
combined both multilateral and regional strategies by trading either with a rich partner 
(North/South integration) or with Middle Income Countries (South/South integration). 
Are these strategies perfect substitute? This is a key question as multilateralism today is 
an uncertain strategy at the time when negotiations are apparently in a deadlock. Thus, 
countries disappointed by multilateralism could be tempted by regional agreements. 
This question is also a key issue of international trade theory. Until 1950 
economists held an ‘all-trade-is-good’ view, meaning that any form of regionalism is a 
perfect substitute for multilateralism. But as pointed out by Viner (1950), a 
discriminatory trade regime not only creates trade, but it also diverts trade, implying 
adverse terms-of-trade effects. Trade diversion effects have been too long 
underestimated. From an empirical point of view, several studies have recently 
highlighted their importance: Yeats (1996), for example, demonstrates that the creation of 
MERCOSUR gave birth to increased intra - MERCOSUR exports of capital-intensive 
products, while the same products are not more exported to third economies. 
From an analytical point of view, Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) claimed that a 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) between “Natural Trade Partners” (NTP) should be 
                                                 
6 Turkey and Lebanon are ranked 103
rd and 128




th.    4
necessarily welfare – improving. The NTP concept was expanded by Summers (1991) 
and Krugman (1991); they founded natural trade on a criterion of volume of trade and 
distance. But, Bhagwati and Panagarya (1996) demonstrated that a regional agreement 
between countries with high initial volume of trade or between close countries does not 
necessarily reduce the likelihood of trade diversion and could be welfare – reducing.  
These issues are quite relevant in the case of SM countries. They illustrate that 
neither a North/South regional integration like the Euromed partnership — following the 
line of Summer’s volume-of-trade criterion — nor a South/South integration like the pan-
Arabian free trade area — following Krugman’s distance criterion — are a priori 
beneficial. In that sense they are not necessarily perfect substitute for multilateralism
7.   
The dynamic analysis is even more remarkable, assessing whether a regional 
agreement accelerates or decelerates the move towards multilateral free trade. While 
Bhagwati and Panagarya (1996) have put on the table the general framework of this 
debate, in terms of “building versus stumbling blocks”, a few recent papers study the 
possibility that the regional time-path may affect multilateralism. From political economy 
models, Krishna (1995) and Levy (1996) show that the constitution of a regional 
agreement can undermine or even eliminate the domestic support for multilateralism.  
A straightforward method to assess if regionalism and multilateralism substitute 
each other is to evaluate the implications of openness on sector production. To do so, a 
                                                 
7 The debate has been “polluted” by the Kemp and Wan’ approach (1996) which demonstrates that for a set 
of countries it is always possible to determine a custom union which leaves the nonmembers’ welfare 
unchanged while improving members’ situation. As suggested by Bhagwati, Greenaway and Panagarya 
(1998) this result is an existence theorem which does not state that any regional agreement is welfare – 
improving.    5
Computable General Equilibrium Model can be utilized. Multilateral liberalization is 
efficient as it implies reallocation of productive factors from sectors where a country has 
a comparative disadvantage to a sector where it has an advantage. In the long term, when 
productive factors are reallocated, the economy is more efficient and richer.  
But in the short or medium term, the opening of economy incurs a social cost. 
Any trade openness that serves as a first step towards the allocation of productive factors 
warranted by the most efficient trade regime is an attractive policy.  
In this sense, regionalism can be attractive as far as it implies an allocation of 
productive factors, which is conform to the one ensured by multilateralism
8.  This paper 
uses the concept of structural congruence, first introduced by Roland Holst and Van der 
Mensbrugghe (2003); it is defined by “similarity in the composition of real sectoral 
output within a country under two different policy regimes” (Roland Holst and Van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2003, p. 24). A statistical indicator of structural congruence is proposed as 
Roland Holst and Van der Mensbrugghe’ analysis was not systematic.  
In a nutshell, most SM countries are very protectionist, but they enjoy a fairly 
good access to world markets, either due to their product specialization or to preferences 
granted by the European Union in the industrial sector. These countries are 
simultaneously opting for multilateralism, North-South regionalism and South-south 
regionalism. Are these options substitutes? Using a multi-country computable general 
equilibrium model, this paper concludes on a negative answer. According to the 
                                                 
8 Implicitly we suppose here that full multilateral liberalization is the most efficient regime. It can be 
considered justified from a collective point of view.   6
“Vinerian” approach, a South-South integration of SM countries is not enough trade – 
creating, while a North – South PTA with Europe is significantly trade – diverting, 
particularly in the case of SM countries’ agricultural imports. According to the 
“Bhagwati – Panagarya” approach, the advantage of a partnership with Europe is that it 
is a “building block” (for Turkey and Tunisia) while a Great Arabian League is a 
“stumbling block” for Tunisia. 
The policy conclusions here emphasize that multilateralism appears to be the best 
option for SM countries and that they should support this negotiation. On regionalism, 
the FTA with the European Union is a much better direction than the implementation of a 
greater Arabian FTA. Furthermore, this last option tends to create adverse allocation of 
productive factors in these countries, as compared to the one implied by multilateral free 
trade. This last policy conclusion is pointed out by the measure of structural congruence 
in this paper.  
Section 2 provides an assessment of SM countries’ protection and their access to 
the world market. Section 3 evaluates the macroeconomic impact of three different trade 
strategies with the help of the MIRAGE model
9. Section 4 studies the consistency of SM 
countries’ trade policies followed by Section 5, which concludes the study. 
                                                 
9The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) in Paris. Full description of the model is available at the CEPII Web site (www.cepii.fr) and in 
Bchir, Decreux, Guerin and Jean (2002).   7
2.  TRADE AND MARKET ACCESS IN SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES: SOME PRELIMINARY STATISTICS 
An important historical feature of SM countries is that they implemented Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy in the 1960s, which resulted in high 
protection of domestic industry. Their current structure of protection, partially, reflects 
this legacy: protectionism is high in these countries and in some countries such as Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria, industry is still more protected than agriculture — a very uncommon 
feature of trade policy (see Chaherli, 2002; Devlin, 2003; Oliva, 2000; Srinivasan, 2002). 
This section studies the market access issue in SM countries using the MacMap-HS6 
database
10.  
2.1  MARKET ACCESS IN SM COUNTRIES 
Table 1 provides a global picture of protection in SM countries, first for the entire 
economy, and second, by differentiating agricultural, industrial, and primary (non-
agricultural) activities
11. In order to evaluate the relative importance of these figures, the 
same indicators are calculated for three sets of countries (OECD countries, Middle 
Income Countries – MICs, and Least Developed Countries – LDCs), then at the world 
level.  
                                                 
10 MAcMap-HS6 is a database providing with a consistent, ad-valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties 
and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System 
(5,111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. Special emphasis has been placed on 
minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, and on acknowledging structural differences 
in export specialization. This database is a collective work realized at Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales, Paris and at the International Trade Centre, Geneva. 
11 These are weighted averages of import duties according to the methodology defined in Bouet et alii 
(2005).   8
That the average levels of protection are low in rich countries is well recognized 
by now, especially in the Quad (Canada, European Union, Japan, and US). Nevertheless, 
the sector dispersion of tariff protection is high in most OECD countries (Japan, 
Switzerland, EU, and Canada): agriculture is highly protected, whereas industry is almost 
free from any protection. In developing countries, overall protection is frequently higher 
and less dispersed across sectors; exceptions to this are Madagascar and Lesotho which 
only protect their agricultural sector. Table 1 also points out uneven levels of protection 
in agriculture and industry in China, India, and South Africa. 
Evidently, market access in SM countries is very restricted. Figure 1 ranks 
countries throughout the world by their overall level of protection, as calculated by the 
MacMaps-HS6 database. Protection ranges from 0.0% in Hong-Kong to 46.0% in 
Bermuda.  
SM countries are clearly in the protectionist group
12. The overall rate of 
protection is very high in Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia and especially in Egypt. 
Exceptions to this are Turkey, whose protectionist trends have been outweighed in the 
last decade by the European influence, and Lebanon which has been a proponent of free 
trade for a long time. It is noteworthy, however, that the Turkish agriculture remains 
highly protected. In other SM countries, market access is restricted; the level of 
protection is relatively high as compared to MICs.  
 
                                                 
12 They are pointed out on Table 1 by initials: A for Algeria, E for Egypt, J for Jordan, Le for Lebanon, Li 
for Libya, M for Morocco, S for Syria, Tn for Tunisia, Tr for Turkey.    9
Table 1—Global and sector-level protection in SM countries 
      Global Agriculture Industry  Primary 
SM countries  Algeria 13.8%  19.6%  13.7% 7.4% 
  Egypt 28.9%  16.4%  32.1%  4.7% 
  Jordan 11.1%  18.0%  10.9%  4.7% 
  Lebanon 3.8%  9.5%  3.3%  2.8% 
  Libya 21.1%  13.5%  18.8%  61.2% 
  Morocco 20.7%  43.1% 19.0%  14.3% 
  Syria 16.2%  16.3%  17.0%  6.3% 
  Tunisia 20.0%  56.2%  17.3% 8.9% 
  Turkey 6.0%  40.8%  3.0% 0.4% 
          
OECD countries  Australia 5.1%  3.1%  5.4%  4.6% 
  Canada 3.4%  13.6%  2.7% 0.1% 
  EU 3.1%  15.9%  2.4%  0.1% 
  Japan 4.1%  33.2%  1.5%  0.2% 
  Switzerland 4.5%  38.7%  1.7%  0.2% 
  US 2.4%  4.8%  2.4%  0.0% 
          
MI countries  Argentina 12.5%  12.4% 12.9%  1.2% 
  Brazil 11.7%  11.3%  12.6%  0.7% 
  China 14.1%  26.1%  13.9%  0.7% 
  India 33.5%  61.2%  30.5%  20.8% 
  Pakistan 18.3%  28.8%  17.6%  7.3% 
  South Africa  8.4%  19.5%  7.5%  0.8% 
          
LDCs  Bangladesh 16.7%  22.4%  15.3%  24.2% 
  Cambodia 14.7%  14.3% 15.4%  6.2% 
  Chad 15.7%  22.1% 14.5%  10.2% 
  Ethiopia 14.3%  18.3%  13.6%  6.1% 
  Lesotho 7.6%  22.3%  6.0% 0.3% 
  Madagascar 4.4%  5.3%  4.3%  0.3% 
 LDC  13.4%  17.8%  12.6%  12.8% 
 MIC  9.7%  21.5%  8.9%  3.9% 
 OECD 3.4%  15.7%  2.6%  0.4% 
   World  5.5%  17.8%  4.7%  1.4% 
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation.   10





































Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation.  11
A very common feature of trade policies throughout the world is that they impose 
higher protection on agricultural sector than on the industrial one (see the case of Japan 
and Switzerland on Table 1). Nevertheless, this is not the case for three SM countries: 
Egypt, Libya and Syria. This is obviously a result of an “infant industry” strategy, which 
has prioritized the protection of domestic manufactures. At a more disaggregated level, 
not only SM countries are imposing on average high duties, but tariffs are also extremely 
dispersed across products
13; market access is severely restricted for meat and dairy 
products in Morocco, for beverages in Syria, for meat cut flowers, coffee, tea and spices, 
and sugar in Tunisia, and for meat, sugar, and cocoa in Turkey. 
2.2  MARKET ACCESS FOR SM COUNTRIES 
Traditionally, protection is measured only from the importing country’s 
perspective; namely by the barriers the importing country imposes on the exporting 
country’s products. Nevertheless, access to foreign markets is a key issue of trade 
negotiations. The MacMap-HS6 database has included the exporter’s dimension in 
assessing world protection, it also allows for measuring market access from the 
perspective of the exporting country.  
Table 2 indicates the average duties faced on exports with the same structure as 
Table 1. Differences in market access reflect a product composition (a country is more or 
less specialized in highly protected sectors), a geographic concentration of exports 
                                                 
13 Devlin (2003) outlines a rising dispersion in MENA countries’ tariffs.    12
(whether a country’s exports are more or less concentrated towards very protectionist 
countries or free-traders) and the trade preferences that countries have been granted.  
Table 2—Average duty faced on exports 
      Global Agriculture  Industry  Primary 
SM countries  Algeria 1.1%  9.8%  1.3%  0.9% 
  Egypt 5.7%  18.0% 4.8%  1.5% 
  Jordan 10.5%  23.9%  9.1%  3.9% 
  Lebanon 8.5% 18.2%  6.3%  2.2% 
  Libya 1.1%  11.0% 3.3% 0.8% 
  Morocco 5.2%  8.4%  4.8%  1.4% 
  Syria 3.6%  11.5% 7.5% 1.1% 
  Tunisia 5.6%  20.4%  4.9%  0.8% 
  Turkey 7.7%  11.7%  7.2%  3.0% 
         
OECD countries  Australia 9.1%  29.1%  4.8%  2.3% 
  Canada 4.1%  15.4%  3.3%  1.0% 
  EU 5.9%  17.2%  4.8%  1.8% 
  Japan 6.0%  11.5% 6.0% 4.5% 
  Switzerland 3.1%  17.1%  2.7%  1.8% 
  US 5.8%  19.9%  4.4%  2.0% 
         
MI countries  Argentina 13.6% 18.2%  11.1%  3.8% 
  Brazil 11.3%  24.2%  6.9%  1.8% 
  China 6.1%  14.2% 5.5%  2.2% 
  India 7.5%  16.7% 6.0% 2.1% 
  Pakistan 8.3% 22.5%  5.9%  3.0% 
  South Africa  6.6%  19.5%  5.7%  1.5% 
         
LDCs  Bangladesh 5.0%  3.0%  5.1%  8.7% 
  Cambodia 5.4%  12.0%  5.3%  6.0% 
  Chad 2.0%  37.0% 1.2% 0.4% 
  Ethiopia 8.3% 8.9%  3.1%  17.1% 
  Lesotho 4.9% 6.8%  4.9%  14.6% 
  Madagascar 4.1%  3.9%  4.4%  2.4% 
 LDC  4.4%  10.7%  4.8%  1.4% 
 MIC  5.5%  18.1%  5.2%  1.4% 
 OECD  5.5%  17.7%  4.5%  1.3% 
   World  5.5%  17.8%  4.7%  1.4% 
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation.  
   13
Differences in average duties faced by SM countries on their exports may come 
from their product specialization. For example, exports from Algeria and Libya are little 
taxed (gas and petroleum) Other SM countries are clearly taking advantage of the 
Euromed agreements and of the duty reduction on textile and apparel exports. 
Agricultural products are much more protected but this is a lesser concern for these 
countries compared to large agro-food exporters such as Argentina, Australia, and 
Brazil
14.  
  Figure 2 ranks countries throughout the world according to the average duty faced 
on exports. For SM countries, this reaffirms a fairly good access to foreign markets. 
Contrarily to their positioning on Figure 1, SM countries are spread throughout the 
distribution curve, with a very low position for Algeria, indicating a very good market 
access. 



























Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation. 
                                                 
14  on this point the global figure must be compared to the two sector-level figures   14
2.3  A BILATERAL PERSPECTIVE ON MARKET ACCESS 
Table 3 indicates bilateral import duty, that is to say the average duty faced on 
exports of countries ranked in columns, at destination of countries ranked in rows. For 
example, Lebanon faces an 18.4% tariff on its exports to Algeria. 
Remarkably, the duties that the SM countries’ exports to the European Union face 
are very low: from 0% for Algeria up to 2.2% for Lebanon. It is quite similar to the 
excellent access that LDCs have been granted for their exports to Europe. This is a result 
of the Euromed agreement — even if its product coverage is far from complete, it is quite 
positive in industry and especially in apparel and clothing where SM countries are 
competitive. This is an important element of trade for these countries since the European 
Union is one of the richest markets in the world and since it is a close destination for SM 
countries’ exports. The market access and proximity can influence the geographical 
distribution of SM countries’ exports. Access to other OECD markets is much more 
restricted. Average duties that SM countries face on exports to MICs and LDCs are much 
higher.   15
Table 3—Bilateral protection – 2001 
Partner
A






































































































Reporter Algeria 14.6% 15.3% 18.4% 8.6% 0.0% 12.8% 19.1% 19.7% 11.1% 10.3% 14.6% 12.9% 12.4% 12.0% 14.0% 14.6% 19.9% 17.0% 17.8% 14.8% 18.1% 15.5% 5.5% 9.4% 8.4% 23.4%
Egypt 7.3% 10.2% 17.6% 3.2% 14.0% 23.8% 15.1% 77.2% 11.7% 10.1% 28.6% 17.7% 12.8% 28.2% 16.0% 22.8% 142.6% 51.6% 45.0% 35.2% 63.9% 42.4% 6.1% 7.0% 13.0% 0.0%
Jordan 18.8% 5.8% 7.9% 3.6% 4.5% 5.0% 7.1% 16.2% 6.9% 7.8% 12.6% 10.9% 8.2% 9.9% 9.8% 11.1% 15.9% 10.4% 3.9% 14.1% 5.7% 4.4% 1.1% 4.5% 2.6% 23.4%
Lebanon 2.0% 3.3% 5.8% 2.3% 1.8% 2.2% 4.5% 7.8% 2.5% 3.0% 4.7% 3.0% 2.8% 3.8% 5.0% 4.8% 5.5% 3.4% 2.8% 5.7% 3.3% 1.9% 0.5% 3.2% 1.7% 4.0%
Libya 37.9% 7.6% 5.2% 11.6% 0.0% 24.0% 7.0% 18.7% 15.5% 16.0% 21.6% 21.7% 15.2% 20.5% 24.4% 19.4% 18.9% 9.8% 14.1% 17.1% 8.0% 10.2% 1.4% 7.7% 27.1% 6.5%
Morocco 0.0% 20.5% 11.1% 16.6% 0.0% 12.7% 15.8% 34.1% 31.4% 22.1% 18.6% 17.9% 16.8% 19.5% 28.0% 26.6% 28.4% 33.8% 38.6% 28.0% 30.5% 36.6% 4.0% 27.6% 10.9% 33.1%
Syria 10.1% 16.1% 10.8% 17.2% 7.1% 9.7% 18.3% 27.7% 8.3% 10.1% 20.0% 17.6% 7.9% 14.0% 16.7% 18.0% 25.1% 13.4% 30.3% 17.0% 17.9% 23.8% 28.8% 14.8% 8.3% 22.8%
Tunisia 4.0% 15.9% 15.7% 21.8% 4.7% 16.6% 12.8% 40.1% 30.4% 38.7% 12.0% 20.6% 22.2% 23.7% 33.2% 25.0% 32.0% 30.3% 25.9% 28.8% 28.3% 28.4% 1.8% 34.3% 10.4% 34.8%
Turkey 0.6% 12.0% 5.4% 11.4% 1.3% 12.1% 6.6% 16.1% 17.6% 10.6% 3.2% 4.4% 0.6% 6.2% 16.7% 18.6% 9.4% 14.5% 9.1% 11.1% 7.8% 8.6% 0.2% 6.5% 2.2% 19.3%
Australia 2.7% 7.7% 12.7% 4.4% 5.0% 10.4% 5.7% 13.8% 12.0% 4.2% 5.8% 6.3% 2.8% 3.3% 2.4% 3.2% 6.4% 8.1% 14.8% 4.3% 16.3% 17.9% 0.1% 0.7% 19.8% 8.0%
Canada 0.0% 4.5% 9.9% 4.7% 0.4% 8.0% 1.1% 9.8% 8.0% 4.4% 4.7% 2.6% 3.0% 0.5% 2.1% 4.3% 4.9% 6.0% 10.7% 1.7% 15.1% 17.2% 0.0% 0.4% 18.5% 6.4%
EU 0.0% 1.3% 2.0% 2.2% 0.3% 0.9% 0.4% 1.6% 1.1% 9.3% 4.8% 0.3% 4.0% 0.6% 3.6% 6.6% 7.0% 4.1% 5.5% 2.2% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 1.0%
Japan 0.9% 7.2% 6.2% 6.8% 0.2% 6.5% 1.4% 6.4% 4.9% 11.9% 3.7% 4.6% 1.8% 3.0% 8.6% 7.6% 3.8% 12.9% 20.9% 3.4% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 7.5% 0.3% 3.4%
Switzerland 0.0% 6.7% 18.2% 7.9% 0.0% 8.1% 1.8% 3.5% 6.9% 18.2% 5.5% 3.9% 1.2% 5.4% 16.7% 13.4% 1.4% 5.3% 11.7% 2.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.2% 0.3%
US 0.2% 3.7% 4.2% 2.3% 0.2% 5.8% 1.1% 6.3% 5.9% 2.0% 0.1% 2.8% 1.9% 2.2% 3.5% 3.0% 4.5% 4.6% 8.2% 0.7% 11.7% 12.4% 2.0% 0.6% 12.0% 5.0%
Argentina 0.2% 13.0% 10.7% 15.3% 1.0% 7.9% 7.7% 9.5% 16.2% 11.1% 12.5% 13.8% 13.5% 11.3% 13.2% 4.7% 15.4% 13.9% 16.6% 12.5% 16.0% 9.3% 7.7% 10.8% 17.0% 12.8%
Brazil 0.4% 10.9% 7.1% 10.3% 1.0% 7.9% 5.0% 11.6% 15.7% 8.6% 8.8% 13.9% 14.0% 9.6% 10.6% 3.3% 15.2% 11.6% 14.5% 11.7% 13.5% 9.7% 9.1% 6.6% 9.9% 10.1%
China 4.6% 10.6% 10.3% 13.8% 1.7% 9.8% 6.8% 16.2% 19.2% 11.1% 10.4% 16.4% 15.4% 11.2% 13.7% 24.6% 24.2% 12.6% 11.1% 13.8% 8.5% 20.7% 2.1% 7.4% 17.4% 5.5%
India 15.6% 24.6% 29.4% 32.1% 31.2% 30.4% 13.4% 31.0% 34.1% 34.6% 38.7% 32.9% 36.0% 33.8% 30.8% 48.3% 34.6% 34.9% 41.3% 34.7% 13.2% 31.3% 28.4% 35.9% 34.5% 35.8%
Pakistan 9.6% 12.4% 15.1% 17.6% 12.6% 12.6% 7.8% 17.5% 21.1% 11.7% 13.4% 19.4% 30.5% 8.1% 17.7% 35.9% 22.3% 19.8% 18.4% 14.4% 12.0% 12.8% 15.9% 23.2% 24.7% 20.3%
South Africa 1.8% 10.3% 4.7% 14.7% 0.4% 5.3% 8.5% 6.0% 15.6% 15.9% 10.2% 8.2% 7.5% 2.9% 8.0% 8.6% 18.1% 12.6% 13.9% 17.4% 18.1% 6.1% 13.3% 2.9% 0.0% 11.6%
Bangladesh 13.3% 21.3% 13.0% 19.6% 17.3% 15.5% 7.4% 14.4% 23.2% 9.5% 10.1% 14.9% 17.2% 7.2% 15.8% 17.3% 19.2% 20.5% 17.2% 18.4% 12.0% 12.8% 23.8% 19.7% 19.0% 29.4%
Cambodia 3.8% 9.1% 9.6% 15.6% 6.4% 9.1% 10.9% 9.5% 14.2% 7.7% 11.0% 14.4% 17.6% 4.1% 15.7% 10.6% 12.0% 13.1% 11.3% 9.0% 7.6% 15.0% 10.5% 13.6% 14.6% 15.3%
Chad 11.3% 15.9% 11.5% 15.8% 7.5% 23.3% 20.4% 24.0% 18.5% 11.8% 13.1% 14.8% 14.3% 12.7% 11.9% 14.8% 21.9% 20.2% 17.8% 16.4% 16.6% 10.1% 22.3% 13.9% 12.7% 18.7%
Ethiopia 5.9% 9.4% 9.0% 15.1% 0.8% 26.4% 27.3% 21.0% 16.8% 9.6% 8.0% 14.8% 11.5% 12.2% 9.4% 9.6% 9.2% 22.6% 17.3% 11.6% 14.4% 18.6% 27.8% 13.8% 15.7% 12.9%
Lesotho 3.6% 6.9% 6.1% 9.2% 2.5% 3.1% 15.5% 7.7% 13.2% 4.9% 10.9% 7.3% 8.7% 1.3% 9.6% 8.8% 17.5% 9.1% 14.0% 9.3% 0.0% 5.7% 2.9% 22.4% 8.2% 4.5%
Madagascar 0.7% 0.0% 2.3% 4.9% 0.3% 5.8% 5.8% 4.9% 3.7% 2.1% 2.4% 4.5% 5.4% 4.3% 3.2% 2.4% 7.8% 5.6% 3.8% 1.6% 4.4% 6.8% 7.6% 3.5% 5.2% 3.5%
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation.   16
2.4  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PREFERENCES  
Table 4 evaluates the impact of trade preferences on access to foreign markets. 
The column “Apparent margin” provides the difference between the world average duty 
faced on exports and the national average; this is given for each country, globally, and for 
each sector. This apparent margin is positive for Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Syria, 
highlighting a better access to foreign markets than the world average. MICs are 
frequently penalized by a negative apparent margin, while LDCs are favored. 
But the information from the first column must be carefully interpreted. As 
previously explained, differences in apparent margins clearly reflect several points: (i) 
trade preferences granted on exports; (ii) regional agreements; (iii) a geographical 
composition effect; and (iv) a product composition effect. Bouet, Fontagne and Jean 
(2005) have proposed a method to disentangle the composition effect (difference in 
market access due to the sector and geographic composition of trade) and the preference 
effect (called “True Preferential Margin” on Table 4, reflecting the impact of regional 
agreements and preferences on market access). They are indicated on Table 4 — a 
positive value reflects that market access is improved due to this effect.  
The Euromed agreements have clearly given SM countries a large preference in 
the industrial activity. For Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey, 
a major part of their exports is apparel. As this product is significantly taxed in the 
European MFN regime, it results in a positive true preferential margin. Conversely, the 
concentration of Algerian and Libyan exports in gas (see the product composition of SM   17
countries’ trade on Table 5), on which imports duties are low throughout the world, 
implies a positive composition effect.  
The external trade of these countries is strongly affected by close economic 
relations with Europe, which have evolved due to geographic proximity and the high 
level of European income, but also due to an important role that trade agreements may 
have played. Figure 3 measures this point.  
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Table 4—Apparent margin, composition effect and true preferential margin on exports  
   Global  Agriculture  Industry  Primary (not agric.) 




























SM countries  Algeria 4.4%  5.4%  -1.0% 8.0%  11.4%  -3.5% 3.4%  3.8%  -0.3% 0.5%  0.6%  -0.2% 
  Egypt -0.2%  -2.2%  2.0%  -0.2%  -1.7%  1.5% 0.0%  -2.6%  2.6% -0.2%  -0.2%  0.1% 
  Jordan -5.0%  -6.5%  1.6%  -6.1%  -4.0%  -2.1%  -4.4%  -6.4%  2.0%  -2.5%  -2.7% 0.2% 
  Lebanon -3.0%  -9.9%  6.9%  -0.5%  1.8%  -2.3% -1.5%  -9.8% 8.3%  -0.8%  -1.3%  0.5% 
  Libya 4.4%  5.7% -1.3%  6.7%  12.3%  -5.6% 1.4%  1.9%  -0.5% 0.5%  0.7%  -0.2% 
  Morocco 0.3% -2.1%  2.4%  9.4%  11.0%  -1.6%  -0.1%  -2.8%  2.7%  -0.1%  -1.1%  1.0% 
  Syria 1.9%  1.6%  0.3%  6.3%  8.9%  -2.6% -2.7%  -6.9% 4.2%  0.3%  0.4%  -0.1% 
  Tunisia -0.1%  -2.5% 2.3%  -2.7%  -0.5% -2.2% -0.2%  -3.2% 3.0%  0.5%  0.1%  0.4% 
   Turkey -2.2%  -4.5% 2.3%  6.0%  6.9% -0.9% -2.5%  -4.9% 2.4%  -1.6%  -2.2%  0.5% 
OECD 
countries 
Australia -3.5% -4.6%  1.1%  -11.3%  -14.0% 2.7%  -0.1%  -0.1%  0.0%  -0.9%  -0.9%  -0.1% 
  Canada 1.4%  1.3%  0.1%  2.4%  0.5% 1.9% 1.4%  1.6% -0.1%  0.4%  0.4%  0.0% 
  EU -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.1%  0.6%  0.2%  0.4%  -0.1%  0.2%  -0.3%  -0.5%  -0.6%  0.1% 
  Japan  -0.5%  0.8% -1.3% 6.3%  11.7%  -5.5% -1.3%  -0.4% -0.9% -3.1%  -3.1%  -0.1% 
  Switzerland 2.4%  2.6%  -0.2%  0.6%  2.7%  -2.1% 2.1%  2.0%  0.1%  -0.4%  -0.6%  0.1% 
   US -0.2%  -1.0%  0.7%  -2.1%  -5.4%  3.2%  0.3%  -0.1%  0.4%  -0.6%  -1.0%  0.3% 
MI countries  Argentina -8.0%  -12.1% 4.0%  -0.4%  -4.2%  3.8%  -6.3%  -6.2%  -0.1%  -2.5%  -2.5%  0.0% 
  Brazil -5.7%  -6.8%  1.1%  -6.4%  -6.5%  0.1%  -2.1%  -2.0%  -0.2%  -0.5%  -0.5%  0.0% 
  China  -0.5%  -0.4% -0.1% 3.5%  6.6%  -3.1% -0.8%  -0.9% 0.1%  -0.9%  -1.2%  0.3% 
  India  -2.0%  -3.5% 1.5%  1.0%  4.0%  -3.0% -1.3%  -3.1% 1.8%  -0.7%  -0.8%  0.1% 
  Pakistan -2.8%  -5.7% 2.9%  -4.7%  -1.7% -3.1% -1.2%  -4.7% 3.5%  -1.6%  -1.9%  0.3% 
   South  Africa  -1.0%  -0.7% -0.3% -1.7%  1.7%  -3.4% -1.0%  -0.9% -0.1% -0.2%  -0.2%  0.0% 
LDCs  Bangladesh 0.5%  -4.7%  5.2%  14.8%  15.4%  -0.6% -0.4%  -6.0% 5.6%  -7.3%  -12.8% 5.5% 
  Cambodia 0.1% -5.3%  5.4%  5.7%  7.6%  -1.9% -0.6%  -6.5% 5.9%  -4.6%  -6.9%  2.2% 
  Chad 3.5%  0.1%  3.5%  -19.3%  -13.5%  -5.8% 3.5%  -1.2% 4.8%  0.9%  0.9%  0.0% 
  Ethiopia -2.8%  -3.4% 0.6%  8.8%  13.2% -4.4% 1.6%  1.0%  0.6%  -15.7% -15.8%  0.1% 
  Lesotho 0.6%  -5.1%  5.7% 11.0%  3.8% 7.2% -0.2%  -6.2%  6.0% -13.2%  -13.2% 0.0% 
   Madagascar 1.4%  -2.6%  4.0%  13.9% 16.0%  -2.1% 0.4%  -4.8% 5.2%  -1.1%  -2.3%  1.2% 
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation.    19
Table 5—Sector breakdown of SM countries’ exports and imports – 2003  
(% of total merchandise exports for exports - % of total merchandise imports for imports) 
 Agric.  raw  material  Food  Fuel Manufactures  Ores  and  metal 
  Exports   Imports  Exports  Imports Exports   Imports  Exports Imports  Exports  Imports 
Algeria 0.0  2.4  0.2  22.4  97.3  0.8  2.1  73.2  0.4  1.2 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  7.0  4.6  8.6  24.9  43.8  5.2  31.0  48.7  3.2  2.5 
Jordan  0.2 1.6 14.5  17.9  0.3  16.7  68.8  59.6  16.1  2.1 
Lebanon  1.8 1.5 19.5  18.5  0.3  16.0  68.1  61.5  9.7  2.4 
Morocco  1.8 3.3 21.5  11.0  1.1  15.7  68.6  67.2  7.1  2.8 
Syrian  Arab  Republic  3.0 4.2 14.0  18.9  71.3  3.7  10.7  70.5  0.9  2.7 
Tunisia  0.9 3.0 7.6 9.1  8.6  6.9  81.5  78.3  1.5  2.7 
Turkey  0.8 3.7 10.0  4.2  2.1  13.0  83.7  68.4  2.0  5.5 
Source: WTO 
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Source: CHELEM and author’s calculation. 



















j i X ,  is exports of 
good h from country i to country j; the dot denotes a sum, and EU means European 
Union. The numerator measures the share of exports towards Europe in country i’s 
exports
16. The denominator is the share of exports towards world exports. Thus, if Europe 
is a relatively key destination for country i, this statistic is greater than unity.  
As a matter of conclusion, SM countries are very protectionist in agriculture and 
in industry, but their access to world markets is relatively good. The trade preferences 
that they have been granted by EU seem to have had a strong impact on orienting the 
geographic structure of their trade.  
                                                 
15 For a presentation, see Freudenberg et al., 1998a and 1998b.  
16 On Figure 2 this is the zone France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Spain, 
Finland, Portugal, Greece. The EU-15 is not available in the CHELEM database.    21
3.  WHAT IS THE BEST TRADE STRATEGY FOR SOUTH-
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES?  
 
There are a number of strategies that SM countries can pursue in order to open 
their economies. From a political point of view, South-South regional integration 
involving Arab countries could be appealing. However, it remains to be seen whether this 
would be economically feasible as compared to South-North regional integration 
(envisaged here as an association with the European Union) and/or a multilateral 
liberalization.  
3.1  A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Computable General Equilibrium Models often have been  used to assess the 
benefits of alternative trade policy options for SM countries. The difference among these 
models is founded in theoretical assumptions, behavioral parameters, as well as  policy 
information, which makes  various studies incomparable. (see Bouet, 2005). These 
models are not fully convergent because they are based on different trade policy 
databases, different Armington trade elasticities, and on different theoretical assumptions. 
Full trade liberalization could be very beneficial for SM countries as large distortions are 
very high. Using the MIRAGE model of the world economy with a specific focus on 
developing countries and their agricultural sectors, Bouet, Mevel and Orden (2006) 
conclude that this trade reform could yield large benefits in terms of real income to 
Tunisia and Turkey— while Morocco may be hurt by deterioration in terms of trade. 
There are two factors that potentially explain this scenario. First, Morocco is initially a   22
net food importer, and full trade liberalization scenario would result in a price increase 
for agricultural products. Second, full trade liberalization would also imply an erosion of 
Morocco’s preferential access to the European industrial market.  
This potentially negative outcome for Morocco, in case of full trade liberalization, 
contrasts with other assessments in the literature, which unanimously agree that there are 
substantial positive gains coming from full trade liberalization in SM countries. Chaherli 
(2002) has carried out a survey of 17 studies between 1997 and 2001, and concludes with 
a strong note on positive welfare gains associated with multilateral liberalization.  
Furthermore, a free trade agreement with the European Union would produce 
smaller gains for these countries. This is clearly illustrated by Bayar (2001) in the case of 
Egypt, and Augier and Gasiorek (2001) who conclude on very small static welfare gains. 
Comparing an FTA with the EU on one hand, and one among Arab countries, on the 
other hand, Dennis (2006) found out that if both options imply small welfare gains, the 
FTA with the EU is twice as likely to have better results.  
3.2  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE MIRAGE MODEL 
In this section, the MIRAGE model is used to analyze several the policy options 
as mentioned above. Different experiments are carried out, and each one represents a 
strategy which SM countries might choose in order to open their economies. In each case, 
implication on welfare, economic activity, remunerations of productive factors, and trade 
flows are studied in order to draw comparisons and design policy recommendations.  
These comparisons are done with a baseline scenario under which the world economy 
grows without any trade reform.   23
The MIRAGE (Modeling International Relationships in Applied General 
Equilibrium) model is a multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium model 
devoted to trade policy analysis. In industry and services, competition is assumed to be 
imperfect while in agriculture competition is perfect. The horizontal product 
differentiation is linked to varieties, but also to geographical origin, while vertical 
differentiation is introduced by distinguishing two quality ranges, according to the 
country origin of the product. The model is applied in a sequential dynamic set-up from 
2006 to 2020, and includes GDP expectations (coming from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators) affecting the factor productivity. The model applies recursive 
dynamics, which means that an investment function modifies the stock of capital at each 
period, and land supply is endogenous. The number of firms adjusts progressively, either 
quickly (fragmented sectors) or slowly (segmented sectors). Installed capital is assumed 
to be immobile, even across sectors and capital reallocation only results from 
depreciation and investment.  
Unskilled labor is imperfectly mobile between agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities; land supply is endogenous with a distinction between countries with low and 
high densities of arable land per person—thus low and high elasticity of land supply.  
There are 24 trading zones and 16 commodities included in the study (see Table 
6). The source of the Social Accounting Matrix is the GTAP6 database; it provides data 
for Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. Other SM countries are categorized in two zones “Rest 
of North Africa” and “Rest of Middle East” which are aggregated here.  
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Table 6—Geographic and commodity decomposition 
No Code 
sector 
Sector No  Code 
country 
Country/Region 
1 rice  Rice  1  aunz  Australia/New  Zealand 
2 whea  Wheat  2  chin  China 
3  cere  Cereal grains nec  3  ddas  Developed Asia 
4  vege  Vegetables fruit nuts  4  dgas  Developing Asia 
5 otag  Other  agric  products  5  indi  India 
6  sugr  Sugar  6  roec  Rest of OECD 
7 plbf  Plant-based  Fibers  7  usam  US 
8  meat  Meat and meat products  8  amla  Latin America 
9  milk  Milk  9  rotw  Rest of the World 
10  fofi  Forestry and fishing  10  euro  European Union 
11 prim  Other  Primary  products  11  turk  Turkey 
12  Food  Other food products  12  rome  Rest of Middle East 
13 text  Textile  13  moro  Morocco 
14 wear  Wearing  14  tuni  Tunisa 
15  leat  Leather products  15  rona  Rest of North Africa 
16  wopa  Wood and paper products  16  ssaf  Sub Saharan Africa 
17  pcop  Petroleum coal products          
18  chem  Chemical products          
19  meta  Metals and metal products          
20  moto  Motor vehicles and equip          
21  equi  Equipment goods          
22  otma  Other manuf products          
23  otse  Other services          
24  trtr  Transport and trade          
 
With regard to product decomposition, an emphasis has been put on agricultural 
commodities and on sectors on which protection is high (cereals, meat and meat products, 
dairy products, sugar, vegetable and fruit, textile, wearing). 
3.3 EXPERIMENT  DESIGN 
There are three experiments carried out, and in each case the change in market 
access is implemented at the HS6 level before aggregation at the sector, and geographic 
decomposition (Table 6). As the social accounting matrix measures macroeconomic 
aggregates for 2001, a pre-experiment is done  taking into account the main trade reforms   25
that affected the world economy from 2001 to 2005—such as the enlargement of the EU, 
the WTO accession of China, the end of implementation of the Uruguay Round, and the 
granting of the EBA and AGOA schemes. Following this, there are three trade reforms 
that are implemented in five years from 2006: 
i)  a South-South regional agreement, which consists of the elimination of all tariff 
barriers between Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and the six other SM countries included 
in the two zones Rest of North Africa and Rest of Middle East. Each country in the 
experiment does not change its trade policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This is a 
Free Trade Area, but not a Custom Union and tariffs are progressively cut through 
a 5-year period of time under a linear formula. 
ii)   A South - North agreement: each SM country negotiates separately a free trade 
agreement with the European Union, in industry and in agriculture; and other trade 
policies are unchanged and the same progressive scheme is utilized.  
iii)   Multilateral full trade liberalization: simulating a Doha Development Agenda is 
rather feasible; however, this methodology is somewhat mis-leading as the final 
liberalizing package as of April 2006 is still unknown. Simulating full trade 
liberalization has its advantages as for each zone, save for the “Rest of the 
World”
17, tariffs are annulled.  
                                                 
17 This zone consists of WTO members and non members, but it is dominated by Russia.   26
3.4 EXPERIMENT  RESULTS 
3.4.1  Impact of a South – South free trade agreement 
According to the experiments here, the impact of a free trade agreement among 
SM countries varies. The effects on macroeconomic variables are reflected on Table 7
18. 
This is a long -term impact and it occurs over a 15-year period. While other zones of the 
Rest of the World are little affected by these trade negotiations, the stakes are higher for 
SM countries. Looking at individual countries however, some of them win and some lose 
from this type of trade liberalization.    
Table 7—Impact of a South-South agreement on macroeconomic variables (rate of 
growth - % - lower figures in italics represent initial values) 














Exports (val _ no intra)  2.5  8.1  7.6  0.0  5.9  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   12.1  10.2  51.9  223.4  43.2  104.8  1210.2  987.9 
Exports (val)  2.5  8.1  7.6  0.0  6.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   12.1 10.2  51.9  240.2  43.4  121.5  2858.7  987.9 
GDP (vol)  0.0  0.7  0.3  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   40.3 24.1  196.5  762.9  221.1  378.9  8847.9  11649.9 
Real return to capital  0.0  1.5  0.7  0.0  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Real return to land  -0.4  -5.6  0.8  0.0  3.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0 
Real return to natural 
resources 
-0.4 -0.7  -3.1  0.0  5.6 0.0  -0.1  0.0 
Skilled real wages  0.1  1.1  0.3  -0.1  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Unskilled real wages  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Unskilled real wages 
in agriculture 
-0.2 -1.9  0.9 0.0  1.9 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Unskilled real wages in 
non agricultural sectors 
0.0 0.6  1.0  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Welfare 0.0  0.7  0.8  0.0  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source: author’s calculation. 
                                                 
18 More detailed results are available if requested to the author.   27
The main beneficiaries, however, are the ‘rest of North Africa’ zone (Algeria, 
Libya, and Egypt, whose welfare increases by almost 2%), Turkey, and Tunisia. This 
substantial gain is due to a cut in distortion and to increased economic activity, driven by 
more exports to SM countries. Turkey and Tunisia have a real comparative advantage in 
textile and apparel and as market access in this sector is restricted in other SM countries, 
Turkish and Tunisian exports of these products increase significantly: 13% and 18% in 
the case of textile, respectively, and 2% and 5% in the case of wearing. Initially, textile 
and apparel represent 21% and 25% of Turkish and Tunisian exports of goods and 
services and this reflects a huge increase in South – South trade flows. Gains for Algeria, 
Libya, and Egypt mainly come from allocative efficiency gains obtained through 
reduction of their own protection. 
The augmentations of Morocco and Rest of Middle East’ exports are timid for 
two different reasons: exports from the Rest of Middle East are dominated by oil and 
petroleum from Syria, but also from other non SM countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran…). 
Morocco’s exports have prioritized OECD (at more than 77%) and are relatively 
unconcerned with the South Mediterranean destination (4.9% of Moroccan exports 
instead of 10% for Tunisia and more than 11% for Turkey), reflecting potentially 
infrastructure problems. Furthermore, the implementation of the free trade agreement 
between South-Mediterranean countries implies trade diversion for countries like 
Morocco. Initially its imports from Europe represent 59% of its total imports; the 
agreement creates trade discrimination between European and other SM countries’ 
suppliers. Imports of rice, wheat, fruit and vegetables, meat from Europe are partially   28
replaced by imports from other SM countries. This substitution clearly means 
deterioration in Morocco’s terms of trade.  
Table 8—Impact of South-South agreements on sector production (initial level-usd 
bln-and rate of growth after 14 years - % -lower figures in italics 
represent initial values) 












Rice -0.9  4.3  -31.6  -0.2  17.6  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
    0.0  0.0 0.0 3.1 0.3 3.6  4.0  4.6 
Wheat -0.5  -38.1  18.0  -0.1  2.2  -0.2  -0.9  -0.6 
    1.9  0.8 2.3 4.1 10.2  1.4  12.8  8.0 
Cereal  grains  nec  -0.2 4.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0  0.0  0.0 
    0.9  0.1 1.0 1.8 3.3 12.0 14.2  26.2 
Vegetables fruit nuts  -0.2  -4.5  -0.1  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 
    2.3  2.5  14.0 20.1 17.9 17.4  53.8  32.7 
Other  agric  products  2.5  -27.1  -5.2 0.1  -8.5 -0.2  -0.1  0.0 
    1.5  0.2 2.9 4.4 3.8 22.7 64.5  57.8 
Sugar  0.0  0.5 0.2 0.0 1.5 0.0  0.0  0.0 
    1.3  0.3 10.5  4.8 5.4 5.4  28.5  37.9 
Plant-based  Fibers  0.0  1.5 -0.7  0.1 1.9 -0.1  0.7  0.1 
    0.4  0.0 4.1 1.7 1.4 2.3  1.7  8.9 
Meat and meat products  -1.5  -0.2  0.5  0.0  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    2.9  1.9 5.8 30.0  17.2  25.8 319.9 285.9 
Milk  0.3  11.4  0.7 0.0 2.3 0.0  0.0  0.0 
    1.1  0.4 6.2 14.4  5.0 3.6  171.3 127.3 
Forestry and fishing  0.1  -0.3  -0.5  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    0.6  0.3 2.5 3.9 2.8 14.0 63.0  24.9 
Other  Primary  products  -0.4  -0.4 -5.9 0.0  2.7  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
    4.2  2.5 7.3 172.3  44.1  59.2 306.0 275.5 
Other  food  products  0.6  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0  0.0  0.0 
    4.6  1.1 5.4 25.9  16.2  44.9 456.4 527.9 
Textile 16.4  8.4  17.2  -1.1  -47.4  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
    1.0  1.1 16.4  12.8  4.5 11.4 124.3 154.4 
Wearing 4.2  1.3  60.0  -0.6  -80.3  -0.3  -0.6  0.0 
    2.7  2.4 6.8 10.8  6.3 5.4  98.7  115.3 
Leather  products  -0.2 3.7 0.9 0.0 -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    1.5  1.0 1.6 3.7 4.7 2.4  60.1  20.2 
Wood and paper 
products 
0.0  3.4 -2.4  0.0 1.4 0.0  0.0  0.0 
    2.3  1.4 5.8 22.6  11.1  18.6 518.1 699.3 
Petroleum coal 
products 
0.0  0.6 -0.6  0.0 2.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
    1.5  0.4 7.1 55.0  12.3  12.6 150.3 165.3   29
Table 8—Impact of South-South agreements on sector production (con’t) 
 












Chemical products  -0.5  11.1  -2.2  -0.2  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    4.1  2.8  12.7 35.8 15.7 21.2  812.1  805.8 
Metals and metal 
products 
-0.7  -0.5 -9.8 0.5  5.9  0.3  0.0  0.0 
    2.5  1.2 13.8  22.2  9.4 32.0 654.6 599.3 
Motor vehicles and 
equip 
-0.7 6.2 -6.3  0.1 1.3 0.2  0.0  0.0 
    1.3  0.7 9.2 11.1  5.1 12.8 694.3 754.4 
Equipment  goods  0.6  3.4 -6.2  0.1 4.8 0.1  0.0  0.0 
    3.2  1.7 16.1  29.2  6.3 13.0 1191.2  1266.3 
Other  manuf  products  -0.1  -2.3 -0.8 0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    2.5  1.3  13.4 75.5 13.1 34.7  491.1  408.8 
Other  services  0.0  -0.2 -0.3 0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    31.6  11.7 68.2 384.5  127.4  173.7 7159.7 10393.2 
Transport and trade  0.0  0.2  -1.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    10.8  8.4  81.9 169.8  63.6 117.7 2454.7 3587.8 
Source: author’s calculation.  
 
Table 8 gives evidence of the production shifts across sectors in South 
Mediterranean countries, European Union, Sub-Saharan Africa and US; inter-sector 
reallocations of production factor are smooth in Morocco and the rest of Middle East 
countries (except the significant increase in activity for textile in Morocco). Nonetheless, 
they are larger in Turkey, Tunisia and Rest of North Africa, with very significant 
increases in the textile, apparel and wheat sectors in Turkey (textile, apparel, milk, metals 
and metal products in Tunisia) at the price of activity contraction in rice, metals and 
metal products (wheat and other agricultural products respectively).    30
3.4.2  Impact of a North – South free trade agreement 
The case of North – South integration, and more precisely the impact of nine 
bilateral free trade pacts signed separately by each SM zone with the European Union is 
now examined. Macroeconomic results are indicated on Table 9.  
They clearly differ from those derived from a South-South agreement as welfare 
increases for only Turkey and Tunisia, while welfare is significantly reduced in Morocco 
and North Africa. 
GDP increases in each of the three SM countries. These three free trade 
agreements have a large trade creation effect, especially in the case of Morocco (whose 
exports are increased by 42%, due to Morocco’s export destination) and Tunisia ( 
46.2%). As in 2001, bilateral protection between Turkey and European Union is lower, 
except for sugar and milk in the case of European market access and agricultural products 
in the Turkish one, trade creation effect is smaller between these two zones, and this 
implies large allocative efficiency effects. 
But the implementation of a free trade agreement has detrimental effects as SM 
countries’ agricultural imports are diverted from competitive producers (Australia – New 
Zealand; Latin America) to non – competitive (European Union). Import prices of 
agricultural products are thus substantially increased in these SM countries (see the 
negative terms of trade effects for all SM countries, particularly strong in the case of 
Morocco and Rest of North Africa). 
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Table 9—Impact of North-South agreements on macroeconomic variables (rate of growth - % - lower figures in italics 
represent initial values) 
 











Exports (val _ no intra)  42.0  46.2  7.4  0.1  19.1  -0.2  2.0  0.0 
    12.1 10.2 51.9  223.4  43.2  104.8  1210.2  987.9 
Exports (val)  42.0  46.2  7.4  0.0  19.0  -0.2  0.8  0.0 
    12.1 10.2 51.9  240.2  43.4  121.5  2858.7  987.9 
GDP  (vol)  0.5 1.6 0.6  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    40.3  24.1 196.5 762.9  221.1  378.9 8847.9  11649.9 
Real return to capital  1.8  1.3  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Real return to land  -9.3  20.8  -2.2 -0.2  -0.3  -0.1  0.6  -0.2 
Real return to natural resources  -8.2  -21.9  -1.3  0.0  3.5  0.0  -0.2  -0.1 
Skilled real wages  -0.6  -2.3  0.9 -0.2 -2.2  -0.1 0.1  0.0 
Terms of trade  -5.9  -0.9  -0.5  -0.2  -3.7  -0.1  0.2  0.0 
Unskilled real wages  -1.6  4.7  0.3  -0.2  -2.2  -0.1  0.2  0.0 
Welfare -0.8  1.3  0.5  -0.1  -0.9  -0.1  0.1  0.0 
               
Source: author’s calculation.  
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Table 10—Impact of North-South agreements on sectoral production (initial level –
USD bln- and rate of growth after 14 years - % - lower figures in italics 
represent initial values) 












Rice -79.7  904.7  102.2  -0.4  220.9  -0.4  -22.7  -1.2 
    0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.3  3.6  4.0  4.6 
Wheat -20.0  -72.1  -11.0  -0.1  2.2  0.3  10.9  -1.4 
    1.9 0.8 2.3 4.1  10.2  1.4 12.8  8.0 
Cereal grains nec  -1.7  -12.6  -14.5  0.0  0.8  0.0  1.2  -0.5 
    0.9 0.1 1.0 1.8 3.3  12.0 14.2  26.2 
Vegetables fruit nuts  8.9  -10.2  1.3  0.0  -0.6  0.0  0.0  -0.1 
    2.3  2.5 14.0 20.1 17.9  17.4  53.8  32.7 
Other  agric  products  55.4  -29.5  -6.3 -0.1 -9.3  -0.2  0.1  -0.2 
    1.5 0.2 2.9 4.4 3.8  22.7 64.5  57.8 
Sugar  0.4 25.8  9.4 -0.3 0.1  -1.1  -4.7  0.0 
    1.3 0.3  10.5  4.8 5.4  5.4 28.5  37.9 
Plant-based  Fibers  1.5  -10.7  0.6 -0.6 4.4  -0.7  -1.3  -0.5 
    0.4 0.0 4.1 1.7 1.4  2.3  1.7  8.9 
Meat and meat products  -22.5  154.9  -24.9  -0.2  -0.7  -0.1  0.2  -0.2 
   2.9  1.9  5.8  30.0  17.2  25.8  319.9  285.9 
Milk -55.5  -19.9  -14.2  -0.3  -3.8  0.2  1.9  0.0 
    1.1  0.4 6.2 14.4 5.0 3.6 171.3  127.3 
Forestry and fishing  0.3  -4.2  -2.0  -0.1  -1.4  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
    0.6 0.3 2.5 3.9 2.8  14.0 63.0  24.9 
Other  Primary  products  -5.1  -18.6  0.4 0.1 4.7  0.0  -0.4  -0.1 
   4.2  2.5  7.3  172.3  44.1  59.2  306.0  275.5 
Other food products  7.2  -13.9  -1.6  -0.4  -3.2  0.0  0.2  0.0 
   4.6  1.1  5.4  25.9  16.2  44.9  456.4  527.9 
Textile 227.3  35.2  3.1  -1.5  -34.0  -0.2  4.3  -0.2 
   1.0  1.1  16.4  12.8  4.5  11.4  124.3  154.4 
Wearing 130.4  98.1  -1.6  -0.6  -64.1  -0.7  5.5  0.0 
    2.7  2.4 6.8 10.8 6.3 5.4  98.7  115.3 
Leather products  -31.8  -8.1  10.6  -0.6  -1.3  0.1  0.5  -0.1 
    1.5 1.0 1.6 3.7 4.7  2.4 60.1  20.2 
Wood and paper 
products 
-13.1 -16.9  0.3  -0.2  -3.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 
   2.3  1.4  5.8  22.6  11.1  18.6  518.1  699.3 
Petroleum coal products  -4.2  -8.3  0.3  -0.1  5.8  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
   1.5  0.4  7.1  55.0  12.3  12.6  150.3  165.3 
Chemical products  -3.1  -17.2  0.9  -0.1  -0.6  0.1  0.0  0.0 
    4.1  2.8 12.7 35.8 15.7  21.2 812.1  805.8 
Metals and metal 
products 
-6.3 -24.2  10.0 -0.3  7.2 -0.3  -0.3  0.0 
   2.5  1.2  13.8  22.2  9.4  32.0  654.6  599.3   33
Table 10—Impact of North-South agreements on sectoral production (con’t) 
 












Motor vehicles and 
equip 
-14.6 -23.4  0.1  -0.2  -13.5 0.3  0.1  0.0 
    1.3  0.7 9.2 11.1 5.1  12.8 694.3  754.4 
Equipment  goods  7.8  -22.1  0.5 0.5 0.0  0.3  -0.4  0.0 
   3.2  1.7  16.1  29.2  6.3  13.0  1191.2  1266.3 
Other  manuf  products -3.3 -12.5 1.0  0.0  -0.3 0.1  0.0  0.0 
    2.5  1.3 13.4 75.5 13.1  34.7 491.1  408.8 
Other services  -1.5  -2.2  -0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   31.6  11.7  68.2  384.5  127.4  173.7  7159.7  10393.2 
Transport and trade  -0.1  -4.4  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
   10.8  8.4  81.9  169.8  63.6  117.7  2454.7  3587.8 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
These agreements clearly indicate much larger shifts in production structure than 
in the case of a South – South agreement, as illustrated on Table 10. A North-South 
regional agreement pushes large contractions of some sectors’ output and expansions of 
others. This process does not match the general scheme of ‘South specialized in 
agriculture vs North in industry’: Turkey’s wheat, cereal grains, milk and meat sectors 
are contracting while textile, leather and metal sectors are expanding. In Morocco, rice, 
wheat, meat, and milk sectors are contracting, while textile, wearing and equipment 
goods sectors are expanding. 
3.4.3  A multilateral full trade liberalization 
The third simulation is a full trade liberalization applied on a multilateral basis 
and at the WTO level (see Table 11).    34
Table 11—Impact of multilateral full trade liberalization on macroeconomic variables (rate of growth - %) 













Exports (val _ no intra)  38.7  29.5  10.0  5.7  21.3  16.7  8.6  6.7 
   12.1  10.2  51.9  223.4  43.2  104.8  1210.2  987.9 
Exports  (val)  38.7  29.5  10.0 5.5 21.3  19.7 2.9  6.7 
   12.1  10.2  51.9  240.2  43.4  121.5  2858.7  987.9 
GDP  (vol)  2.5 3.2 0.8 0.4 2.7 1.3 0.1  0.0 
    40.3  24.1  196.5 762.9 221.1 378.9 8847.9 11649.9 
Real  return  to  capital  1.7 1.4 0.4 0.1 1.9 -0.6 0.2  0.1 
Real return to land  -9.6  3.7  -1.6  -2.8  2.3  1.9  -0.6  3.8 
Real return to natural resources  -6.3  -8.8  1.9  1.1  9.5  0.1  0.5  -0.9 
Skilled  real  wages  4.0 2.1 1.0 0.2 2.3 0.2 0.1  -0.1 
Unskilled  real  wages  -0.5 2.6 0.4 -0.4 0.3 0.3  0.1  -0.1 
Unskilled real wages in agriculture  -3.7  2.8  -0.4  -1.1  0.9  0.7  0.1  0.9 
Unskilled real wages in non agricultural 
sectors 
1.1 2.5 0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.1  0.1  -0.1 
Welfare  1.0 2.3 0.7 0.4 2.2 0.2 0.2  0.0 
Source: author’s calculation.  
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This is obviously the most efficient way to improve national welfare in 
Mediterranean countries. All SM countries gain from this process and their welfare 
benefits are greater than under the two previous scenarios (except for Turkey in the South 
– South case where welfare gain is 0.8%, which is very close to the multilateral gain). 
The ‘rest of North Africa’ zone and Tunisia are the main beneficiaries. The significance 
of this macroeconomic real income gain is due to the extent to which this reform creates 
trade. Due to full trade liberalization scenario, SM countries’ export volumes are globally 
increased by 11.4%, compared with 8.8% under the free trade agreements with EU and 
only 1.9% under the implementation of an SM free trade area. Thus, multilateral full 
trade liberalization is the most efficient outcome for South Mediterranean countries. It 
allows for a large reduction in domestic distortions and it stimulates GDP growth 
especially in Tunisia, Morocco, and other North Africa countries. The GDP increase 
offsets deterioration in terms of trade linked to an augmentation of world agricultural 
prices, which is detrimental to most of these countries. The zones ‘Rest of Middle East’ 
and ‘Rest of North Africa’ are initially net food importers, while Morocco has external 
deficits in meat, milk, sugar, wheat and cereal grains— which are substantially distorted 
sectors. 
Nevertheless full trade liberalization creates much larger reallocations of 
production factors. These shifts in production are highlighted in Table 12. They are larger 
than those coming from regional agreements. In Tunisia and Morocco large expansions 
of the textile / apparel, and equipment sectors have to be put in parallel with large 
contraction of activity in wheat and vehicle sectors.    36
Table 12—Impact of a full trade liberalization on sectoral production (initial level –
USD bln- and rate of growth after 14 years - %) 












Rice  -77.8 37.0  -30.3 0.0  46.6 -23.8 -53.3 81.2 
    0.0 0.0  0.0  3.1 0.3 3.6 4.0 4.6 
Wheat  -22.9  -64.7  -8.5  -1.0 3.6 -10.7 4.4  7.1 
    1.9  0.8 2.3 4.1 10.2  1.4  12.8 8.0 
Cereal grains nec  -2.8  -9.6  -18.7  -10.7  0.8  -1.0  1.4  8.2 
    0.9  0.1 1.0 1.8  3.3  12.0 14.2 26.2 
Vegetables fruit nuts  7.7  -10.2  0.2  -1.1  0.4  2.4  -5.1  3.2 
    2.3  2.5 14.0  20.1 17.9 17.4 53.8 32.7 
Other agric products  26.8  -39.8  3.3  -3.3  -11.0  6.3  -2.3  7.9 
    1.5  0.2 2.9 4.4  3.8  22.7 64.5 57.8 
Sugar  -4.5  1.9 0.6 3.3  0.9  29.1 -32.1 -4.2 
    1.3  0.3 10.5 4.8  5.4  5.4  28.5 37.9 
Plant-based  Fibers  3.6 1.4  0.5  4.7 7.2 -2.2 1.9 0.7 
    0.4 0.0  4.1  1.7 1.4 2.3 1.7 8.9 
Meat and meat products  -22.8  70.1  -22.2  -4.2  -2.8  -3.6  -0.9  3.3 
   2.9  1.9  5.8  30.0  17.2  25.8  319.9  285.9 
Milk  -39.9 -0.4 -7.6  -12.5 -3.1 -14.4  7.2  1.2 
   1.1  0.4  6.2  14.4  5.0  3.6  171.3  127.3 
Forestry and fishing  -1.5  -2.9  -1.3  -0.8  0.4  1.1  -0.1  0.2 
    0.6  0.3 2.5 3.9  2.8  14.0 63.0 24.9 
Other Primary products  -1.9  -5.3  5.3  1.3  7.0  2.3  1.5  -1.0 
   4.2  2.5  7.3  172.3  44.1  59.2  306.0  275.5 
Other food products  8.1  -13.4  -0.8  -2.4  -3.1  -3.1  1.6  0.8 
   4.6  1.1  5.4  25.9  16.2  44.9  456.4  527.9 
Textile  104.9 -0.7 -0.8 -3.7 -64.9 -34.7 -5.6 -11.3 
   1.0  1.1  16.4  12.8  4.5  11.4  124.3  154.4 
Wearing 48.0  18.3  0.3  -11.3  -78.5  -30.4  -6.3  -16.4 
   2.7  2.4  6.8  10.8  6.3  5.4  98.7  115.3 
Leather  products  -34.9  -16.2  2.8 -4.4 -3.3 -23.0 -1.5 -22.3 
    1.5  1.0 1.6 3.7  4.7  2.4  60.1 20.2 
Wood and paper 
products 
-10.2 -7.3 1.0 -1.5  -1.8  -0.9  0.4  0.4 
   2.3  1.4  5.8  22.6  11.1  18.6  518.1  699.3 
Petroleum coal products  2.5  0.1  -0.6  1.3  4.7  -1.7  0.1  -0.4 
   1.5  0.4  7.1  55.0  12.3  12.6  150.3  165.3 
Chemical  products  6.0 10.8  -2.6  5.6 -1.8 -5.4 -0.6 0.3 
   4.1  2.8  12.7  35.8  15.7  21.2  812.1  805.8 
Metals and metal 
products 
0.5 -10.9  4.2 3.8  1.5  13.8 -0.4 -0.4 
   2.5  1.2  13.8  22.2  9.4  32.0  654.6  599.3   37
Table 12—Impact of a full trade liberalization on sectoral production (con’t) 
 












Motor vehicles and 
equip 
-12.3 -3.5 2.6 -0.7  -18.1  13.4  -1.2  -1.5 
    1.3  0.7  9.2 11.1 5.1 12.8 694.3  754.4 
Equipment goods  23.3  15.6  3.2  1.0  -4.2  3.5  0.6  0.6 
    3.2  1.7 16.1  29.2 6.3 13.0 1191.2  1266.3 
Other  manuf  products -1.7 -10.1  2.0 0.2 0.7 0.2  0.5  0.6 
    2.5  1.3  13.4 75.5 13.1 34.7  491.1 408.8 
Other  services  1.0  -0.3 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.2  -0.1  0.0 
   31.6  11.7  68.2  384.5  127.4  173.7  7159.7  10393.2 
Transport  and  trade  2.4  1.0 0.1 0.1 1.6 0.7  -0.1  0.0 
   10.8  8.4  81.9  169.8  63.6  117.7  2454.7  3587.8 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
These large reallocations of productive factors have to be taken into consideration 
as they are the source of social costs, which is the basic idea of the structural congruence 
concept.   38
4.  TRADE AGREEMENTS AND STRUCTURAL CONGRUENCE 
For the vast majority of SM countries’ trading partners, multilateral liberalization 
creates more trade. Because this type of liberalization implies no discrimination among 
trade partners, it does not entail diversion effect. Therefore, multilateral liberalization 
appears to be the most efficient policy. But in the short/medium term trade liberalization 
is costly because it brings change in the domestic productive structure. The scarce factor 
of production is harmed; immobile factors in imports-competing sectors are negatively 
affected. Even abundant mobile factors could pay a short term cost since they have to be 
reallocated from contracting sectors to the expanding ones. This entire process, therefore, 
favors a gradual approach to trade liberalization process.  
 For some advocates of regionalism, including numerous politicians and 
economists like Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, Lawrence Summers
19, a regional 
agreement is an attractive step towards multilateral liberalization. This approach may be 
effective in preparing the domestic economy to international competition, and the process 
would be less “brutal” than multilateral trade liberalization. This is due either to partial 
openness policy or because regionalism often means integration with geographically 
close economies, thus resulting in smaller inter– sectoral factor reallocations. 
                                                 
19 “I therefore assert and will defend the following presumption: economists should maintain a strong, but 
rebuttable, presumption in favor of all lateral reductions in trade barriers, whether they are multi, uni, bi, tri, 
plurilateral. Global liberalization may be best, but regional liberalization is likely to be very good.” – 
Summers, 1991. In the same book edited by the Federal Reserve of Kansas City, Krugman supports, like 
Summers, that not only regional agreements between natural trading partners are welfare – improving, but 
that concluding this kind of preferential agreements is better for multilateral free trade than doing nothing. 
In this paper Krugman quotes Rudiger Dornbusch as a strong supporter of regionalism.   39
The regionalism approach, therefore, needs to be carefully scrutinized, as it 
doesn’t necessarily pave the way to multilateral trade agreements. If the short-medium 
term cost of free trade is reallocation of production factors, it means that a free trade 
agreement or a custom union is a first step towards multilateral free trade only if this 
regional agreement results in the same change of output structure as the one implied by 
multilateral free trade. However, if the creation of a free trade agreement with 
neighboring countries causes a contracting/expanding sector movement that is different 
from the one implied by multilateralism, the above regional approach is clearly 
misleading and a regional agreement may be inefficient.  
4.1  THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURAL CONGRUENCE 
In order to analyze the concepts of regionalism and multilateralism, the notion of 
structural congruence is used. It has been defined by David Roland-Holst and 
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2003) as “a similarity in the composition of real 
sectoral output within a country under two different regimes” (Roland-Holst and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2003).  
Figure 4 illustrates structural congruence of the three trade regimes previously 
studied in the Turkish case. It compares successively the South/South agreement and the 
South/North partnership, with multilateral free trade, pointing out in each case the rate of 
growth in sector output (in % and in volume).  
Under a free trade agreement between South Mediterranean countries, the Turkish 
economy may clearly diverge from the path of multilateral free trade: in this case the 
structural congruence is negative as the shifts of output incurred by the two trade regimes   40
are in the opposite direction in 14 out of 24 cases. On the contrary, when a free trade 
association with the European Union is compared with multilateral full trade 
liberalization, shifts in sector productions are quite parallel, except in 6 out of 24 cases. It 
is noteworthy that expansions/contractions are often larger in the regional trade 
liberalization (see the case of milk, meat and sugar in the bottom Figure 4). The South-
South integration process creates a large reallocation of productive factors in wearing and 
textile due to the preferential access that it creates towards markets previously very 
protected (Syria, Egypt, and so forth). On the contrary, multilateral trade liberalization 
does not greatly modify the level of production of textile and wearing in Turkey (it 
slightly decreases the textile production), as the openness in this sector particularly 
profits to China (+25% and +21% of increased exports in volume, from an initially 
already high level).  
Figure 4—Structural congruence in the Turkish case - rate of growth in sector 
output (in % and in volume)  
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Turkey: multilateral (FTL)/North South (NS)
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Source: author’s calculation.  
 
To a lesser extent, this is also true for Morocco and Tunisia: a South-South 
agreement only implies very smooth readjustment of production. On Figure 5 and Figure 
6, these shifts are remarkably smaller than the ones incurred by full trade liberalization 
under the aegis of WTO. On this matter, free trade with Europe is a much better transition 
path towards multilateralism as variations in sector outputs are well correlated, except for 
chemical and petroleum products (plus equipment goods in the case of Tunisia). For other 
SM countries, Figures are provided in the Annex as they gather several countries making 
their interpretation more difficult.   42
Figure 5—Structural congruence in the Moroccan case - rate of growth in sector 
output (in % and in volume)  
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Figure 6—Structural congruence in the Tunisian case - rate of growth in sector 
output (in % and in volume)  
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Source: author’s calculation.    44
Comments of previous Figures are not sufficient to formulate a policy 
recommendation. They are only based on a visual comparison of evolutions in sector 
productions and do not account for the importance of each sector. This is why in this 
subsection, an original indicator of structural congruence is proposed. This indicator 
summarizes the evolution in all sectors and normalizes the degree of structural 
congruence from 0 to 1 as well as it allows for a direct comparison of two trade reforms 
within the same country, and the same trade reform between two countries.  
4.2  A NEW MEASURE OF STRUCTURAL CONGRUENCE 
This study constructs an index of similarities between two trade regimes, one of 
them being multilateral free trade and serves as a reference as it has been proven to be the 
most efficient trade regime.  
Let 
r
k i X ,  be the production of commodity k done by country i under trade regime r 
and 
r
i X ,.be its total production under the same trade regime. The similarity
20 between 
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The more similar two trade regimes are, the higher this index is; the maximum 
being 1, and the minimum 0. Suppose two sectors, 1 and 2, and two trade regimes, a and 
b. If both regimes, a and b, imply that 50% of total production is in each sector, the index 
                                                 
20 The construction of this index has been inspired by the Finger – Kreinin index on similarities of export 
structure (see Finger and Kreinin, 1979).    45
of similarity is 1. On the contrary, if trade regime a implies that 100% of total production 
is in 1, and b implies that 100% of total production is in 2, the index is 0. 
This, it is possible to assess if a regional agreement reduces the distance towards 
multilateral free trade in terms of productive sectors. This indicator also allows for 
comparison between current production structure and the one implied by full multilateral 
liberalization
21.  
Table 13 calculates these indicators for the four zones studied with the MIRAGE 
model. For each country or zone the first row gives the value of the similarity index 
between the initial trade regime and multilateral full trade liberalization. The next two 
rows carry out the same calculation for a free trade agreement associating SM countries 
with the European Union, then for a free trade area among South Mediterranean 
countries
22.   
Table 13—Indicators of structural congruence 
   Morocco  Tunisa  Turkey  Rest of 
Middle East 
Rest of North 
Africa 
Initial  situation  95.771% 82.432% 71.810% 78.408%  83.721% 
North  South  95.778% 91.491% 99.044% 99.448%  98.839% 
South  South  96.079% 81.747% 72.583% 78.399%  82.764% 
Source: author’s calculation.  
 
                                                 
21 It is noteworthy that Turkey has one of the lowest degrees of protection and the lowest indicator of 
structural congruence for initial situation. Several explanations may be advanced: In Turkey the inter – 
sectoral dispersion of protection is very high (see Table 1)) with a very restricted access to agriculture. In 
fact multilateral trade liberalization creates a strong decrease in agriculture production. Secondly the 
indicator of structural congruence should also depend on access to foreign markets which is particularly 
differentiated by destinations in the case of Turkey (see Table 3). 
22 It could be stated that the complementary to unity defines the economic distance between the trade 
regime considered and multilateral free trade.   46
This indicator clearly shows that for four countries/zones Tunisia, Turkey, the rest 
of North Africa, and the rest of Middle East, concluding a free trade agreement with 
Europe is a first step towards multilateral full trade liberalization. For the last three 
countries/zones the economic distance with this trade regime is greatly narrowed. On the 
contrary, in the case of Morocco, regional agreements do not significantly reduce the 
distance to multilateral free trade.  
The construction of a similarity index allowed for more clear-cut conclusion. For 
Tunisia and Turkey, the Euromed partnership is a first step towards multilateral free 
trade, while from a South-South agreement does not prepare them for multilateral free 
trade.   47
5. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Southern Mediterranean countries could be at a turning point in their economic 
history. Although import-substitution policies have failed, they still isolate these 
economies from the world market to a great extent. For SM countries, trade openness is 
appealing, but it can be attained through different options: unilateralism, multilateralism, 
or regional agreements either with developed countries or among middle income 
countries. 
Nevertheless, these options are not equally beneficial. According to this study, the 
most efficient trade strategy is multilateralism. On the other hand, a regional agreement 
among Arab countries is not worthwhile as it does not yield substantial real income gains 
and it does not imply significant reallocations of productive factors, similar to those 
incurred by a multilateral option. Such an agreement can even create a “stumbling block” 
as it could move the Tunisian economy away from multilateral free trade. The 
Euromed partnership is much more beneficial in creating trade, but this reform increases 
only the real incomes of Tunisia and Turkey. For Morocco, such a reform will divert 
significantly imports from competitive agricultural producers to European farmers. 
Nevertheless, a positive feature of this partnership is that it implies a reallocation of 
productive factors in the direction of multilateral free trade, particularly for Tunisia and 
Turkey.  
If multilateralism is the best policy option, SM countries do not control the 
outcome of these negotiations. This study suggests that it is in their best interests to 
support such a process.    48
Regionalism is an alternative option of trade liberalization. But it has to be carried 
out under a consistent strategy which avoids replication of adjustment costs. To that 
extent, this study emphasizes that for some countries, integrating in the European Union 
is a more consistent economic option than a South-South association. This conclusion is 
particularly important at a time when negotiations led under the aegis of WTO are not 
very promising. In case of an unsuccessful conclusion of these negotiations, the 
developing countries could be tempted by regionalism, but they have to know that all 
openness strategies are not good substitutes of multilateralism.   49
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ANNEX: STRUCTURAL CONGRUENCE IN OTHER SM COUNTRIES - RATE 
OF GROWTH IN SECTOR OUTPUT (IN % AND IN VOLUME) 
Rest of North Africa: multilateral (FTL)/South South (NS)
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Rest of Middle East: multilateral (FTL)/South South (NS)
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